The island disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) are either bilateral, trilateral or, when they involve more than three parties, multilateral. The most serious of these disputes, however, are those on the Paracels and the Spratlys, because they also involve non-Southeast Asians and, in the case of the Spratlys, they involve many parties.

According to the International Hydrographic Bureau, the South China Sea is defined as the body of water stretching from a southwesterly to a north-easterly direction, bordered on the South by 3° South latitude between South Sumatera and Kalimantan (Karimata Straits) and on the north by the Strait of Taiwan, from the northern tip of Taiwan to the Fukien coast of China. For the purpose of this paper, however, the southern perimeter of the South China Sea is deemed to be 1° North latitude, thus making it an area of about three million square kilometers of water.

I. Introduction

Disputes are an inevitable part of international relations1 and it is hardly deniable that, among international disputes, territorial and territorial-related disputes are the most complicated ones. Undoubtedly, these disputes have been the primary source of the growing tension in relations among States which is likely to lead to armed conflicts or eventful wars2 when they are not settled amicably and peacefully. The sanctity of the territorial issue to the peoples in question - nationalism and the associated passions - have made these disputes extremely difficult to resolve. Furthermore, these disputes have been further complicated by historical, cultural, political, military and economic phenomena. Nevertheless, States are required, under international law, to resolve their international disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law so that international peace, security, and justice will not be breached.3

By Derek da Cunha

in Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (eds.), In China’s Shadow, RAND, CF-137-CAPP, 1998, pp. 115–126.

INTRODUCTION

When a group of small states are geographically astride a much larger entity, the inescapable consequence is that the latter exerts an inordinate influence over the former. Thus has been the long-held experience of the states of Southeast Asia in relation to China. As the renowned Sinologist C.P. Fitzgerald has written, "Chinese influence, Chinese culture and Chinese power have always moved southward since the first age of which we have reliable historical evidence." 1 Defined in terms of political geography, China is a Northeast Asian state. However, because of its huge size, China also has a leg in Southeast Asia, a geographical region which senior leaders in Beijing have always tended to view as China’s backyard.

The remarkable economic growth which China has experienced since the late 1970s and Beijing’s increasingly global orientation are expected to spawn a new Chinese activism in Southeast Asia, of which the past few years provide some initial manifestations. To be sure, Chinese economic activism has always been welcomed by the states of Southeast Asia. It is Chinese military activism, however, which is less welcomed by those states, afflicted as they are with a nagging uncertainty over the longterm potential for such activism and the effect it might have on regional peace and stability.

By Nguyen Hong Thao
Paper Presentation in the SCA joint-project workshop on Ocean Security in Asia, Dawhoo – Hanoi, Vietnam, Mai 2005

Dear…

Distinguished guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my honor to be here today at the interesting workshop jointly organized and supported by the Science Council of the Asia (SCA), the Science Council of Japan and Ministry of Science Technology and Environment (MOSTE) to discuss the important subject on Maritime Security in East Asia Seas.