I. Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in Certain Areas in the South China Sea between China National Offshore Oil Corporation and the PNOC, signed in 2004. 

http://vietwill.org/images/agreement-bilateral%20marine%20seismic%20undertaking.pdf

II. Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea (JMSU), between RP, PRC, and Viet Nam, signed in 2005

http://vietwill.org/images/tripartite%20agreement-marine%20scientific%20research.pdf 

By Monique Chemillier-Gendreau.

Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1996. Pp. 306. Price: $42.00 (Paperback).

Reviewed by Steve Carlson.

(The Yale Journal Of International Law, Winter 1997, Vol. 22: 239-241.)

Located in the South China Sea, beyond the territorial limits of the surrounding nations, the Paracel and Spratley Islands for centuries were avoided as a locus of shipwrecks and the violent tropical storms that caused them. Never inhabited, they were visited over the ages by fishermen. These two archipelagos are now covered for their promise of mineral and biological wealth. Ever since the downfall of Imperial Japan, whose retreat from the South China Sea highlighted the strategic position of the Islands, neighboring nations have asserted their sovereignty over them, in order to assume control over fishing rights and potential petroleum reserves. Among the nations contending for sovereignty over the archipelagos, Vietnam maintains the most direct historical claim to the Islands. Its assertions are most strongly countered by those of China, which has militarily occupied the Islands since 1956. Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Philippines have also claimed sovereignty. La Souverainete sur les Archipels Paracels et Spratleys, describes the legal means for assessing the dispute, and the historical background necessary for its resolution.

By Nguyen Nha, Ph.D. (translated by Le Duc)

By Gerald Segal

Below is an excerpt of the full article published in International Security, Vol. 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996) 

The South China Sea Case

China has never hidden its claim to complete sovereignty in the South China Sea. Ever since China emerged from the distractions of the Cultural Revolution, it has sought carefully to extend its control of these disputed waters.(18) China has insisted on its unshakable legal claim to the region, although it has frustratingly never explained the legal basis of its policy nor defined the precise limits of its claim. China signed but has not yet ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Beijing has given no indication that it would accept international arbitration of its claim to sovereignty over every bit of territory in the region. China has been reluctant to take the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in part because, like all the other claimants (Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei), its claim to sovereignty is weak.(19) China has applied the continental shelf principle in defining its maritime claims in the Yellow and East China Sea, but claims the South China Sea on the basis of "historic use and administration."(20) However, China has clearly not had continuous and effective control, administration, and governance of the territory, as the latter principle calls for. And even if some sovereignty claims would be upheld by the court, the tiny outcrops in the sea do not appear to be legally qualified to justify exclusive economic zones of 200 nautical miles or even more extensive continental shelves. Only 26 features in the Spratly group are above water at high tide and the largest has a land area of less than half a square kilometer. None has ever sustained a permanent population. Continental shelf claims from states surrounding the Spratlys are likely to be seen as much stronger by the ICJ.

an Analysis of the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea