VietWill - Defending Vietnamese lives and borders in the South China Sea

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Vietnamese Strategic Culture and the Coming Struggle for the South China Sea.
Butterfield, Andrew A.
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
DEC 1996

Abstract : Despite inferior strength, Vietnam clings to extensive claims in the South China Sea in conflict with China's claims. Through use of the concept of 'strategic culture,' this thesis investigates the factors, including perceived historical lessons, that drive Vietnam to maintain this strategic posture. The most relevant lessons are that (1) China perpetually desires and frequently attempts to dominate Vietnam, and that resistance historically has served Vietnam better than appeasement; and (2) Vietnam has the inherent ability to attract foreign benefactors that will help her balance against Chinese power and achieve her own goals. The author explores how these lessons have shaped a modern-day Vietnamese strategic culture and whether it is suited to the strategic realities that Vietnam currently faces. A conclusion is that Vietnam's current strategic culture is likely to continue either until it is shown to be inadequate in conflict with China over control of the South China Sea, or until Vietnam succeeds in attracting a new benefactor or protector.

Dragon in the Shadows: Calculating China's Advances in the South China Sea
Studeman, Michael W.
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
MAR 1996

Abstract : The dispute between at least six riparian nations over jurisdictional rights to large tracts of the South China Sea continues to reign as one of the most likely flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific theater. The intentions of the chief protagonist in the conflict, China, will in large measure determine whether this dilemma will be resolved peacefully or violently. Relying on three case studies that focus on China's takeover of the Paracel Islands in 1974, its occupation of six reefs in 1988, and subsequent reef-hopping incidents in 1992 and 1995, this study highlights the conditions under which China expanded its presence in the South China Sea. Based on emerging trends, this thesis asserts that resource competition will most likely spark future violence in the South China Sea, and that domestic pressures within China commit Beijing to a course of hard-shell revanchism. At the same time, regional sensitivities to Chinese 'hegemony' and the correlation of military forces that weakly favor China suggest China will strive to avoid or contain a conflict over the near term. By profiling the character and turning of past Chinese 'aggression' in the South China Sea, this thesis also exposes the stratagems by which Chinese armed forces have pursued national objectives in the region.

China in the South China Sea: Genuine Multilateralism or a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?
Jackson, John W.
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
DEC 2005

Abstract : The South China Sea claimants base their claims on ancient documentation and archeological evidence. However, they largely ignored the territories until the 1960s, when natural resource speculations began. The 1982 UNCLOS magnified interest as claimants hoped to extend exclusive economic rights from their claims rather than continental coastlines. Another possible factor behind Chinese claims is the theory that Beijing desires to establish Chinese hegemony in the region. Beijing's shift from bilateral diplomacy and military aggression to multilateral diplomacy has created debate among Sinologists. Many argue that China lacked the power necessary to assert its claims and can now finally attempt assertion again, thus the naval buildup. Others argue that natural resources drive China's SCS policy and still others believe that bureaucratic infighting drives policy. Economic data shows a possible causal relationship between trade and China's political behavior. The 1996 U.S. Presidential campaign slogan, "It's the economy stupid," apparently applies to Beijing's SCS approach as well. The U.S. approach to the disputes remains one of ambivalence. As long as the United States maintains freedom of navigation through the area, Washington should remain concerned but uninvolved. Beijing largely feels the same way, with the important addition of guaranteeing access to the region's natural resources.

The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements
Eric Hyer
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 34-54

Abstract : China's approach toward the territorial disputes in the South China Sea exhibits a pattern similar to the one adopted in earlier territorial disputes settled in the 1960s and China's behavior in its unsettled dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In these previous disputes, even though China asserted large "historical" claims, eventually Beijing concluded settlements based on realistic historical, geographic and security considerations. One conclusion that is drawn is that although Beijing may initially assert irredentist claims, it is more interested in stable and legitimate boundaries than maintaining these historical claims. Adopting a comparative cases approach, this article concludes that if China follows the pattern that was established in earlier disputes in settling the South China Sea disputes, eventually Beijing will seek compromise settlements in order to realize more important national security interests. Using the Sino-Japanese case as a model, it is concluded that compromise settlements in the South China Sea based on principles of equity and modern international legal principles are likely, and China will not insist on recognition of its "historical" claim to all the islands of the South China Sea.

China's Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean
Lee Jae-Hyung; Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, 2002

Introduction

Chinese leaders have long aspired to a great China, a country with a world-class economy and military, and with the restoration of full sovereignty over Taiwan and other disputed islands within its claimed territorial boundaries. After the end of the Cold War, the Chinese leadership began to realize the importance of a navy in accomplishing their grand strategy. In the post-Deng era, Jiang Zemin and high-ranking military officers have been more assertive about Chinese naval modernization through the acquisition of sophisticated weapons and equipment and the development of a blue-water naval strategy. To implement hang's new military doctrine, Admiral Shi Yunsheng, Commander of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has noted that China's twenty-first century navy has to develop in the following fashion: first, an offshore defence strategy; secondly, a strong navy with science and technology; thirdly, more advanced weapon systems; and fourthly, well-trained personnel and more qualified people. (1)

Admiral Shi's blue-print for the development of the PLAN seems to focus on hang's doctrine to achieve China's national objectives of the unification of Taiwan, the control of the South China Sea, and the expansion of maritime influence over the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Any attempt to invade Taiwan by the People's Republic of China (PRC) would invite U.S. naval intervention. Likewise, island disputes in the South China Sea, and the exploration of offshore resources in those areas are confronted with other claimants' responses, including that of Vietnam and the Philippines. China also has to safeguard sea-lanes for its increasing oil imports. More significantly, China attempts to become a great sea-power to compete with America's hegemonic position in the world's oceans. These strategic issues have prodded China to expand its maritime influence in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

China's Naval Surge and Its Threat Perception

China's naval ambitions are not only concerned with neighbouring seas, but also extend farther afield. China is working to expand its strategic depth to more remote regions around Australia, South Africa and the United States to emphasize its position as a world power. (2) China has actively conducted port calls around the world to demonstrate a higher naval profile. In 2001, PLAN vessels conducted a range of visits around the globe, sailing to some twenty-three countries...