VietWill - Defending Vietnamese lives and borders in the South China Sea - Vietnam's aims in the South China Sea: National or regional security?

Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it's the only thing that ever has.

- Margaret Mead

Most Discussed

Latest Updates

Recently Discussed

Vietnam's aims in the South China Sea: National or regional security?

By Stein Tonnesson
Centre for Development and the Environment
University of Oslo, Norway

Paper presented at the 4th Euroviet conference in Passau, Germany
16-18 September, 1999

Download complete pdf file

Abstract

Vietnam has conflicting claims to maritime zones with most of the other states around
the South China Sea. In addition, Vietnam claims sovereignty to the Paracel islands,
which have been fully occupied by China since 1974, and to all the islets in the
Spratly area, where not only Vietnam, but also China, Taiwan, the Philippines and
Malaysia keep garrisons on some of the isles. The multi-national disputes in the South
China Sea form a clear threat to regional security, thus also to Vietnam's integration
into ASEAN and to further improvement of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship.
Vietnam's approach to the South China Sea disputes may therefore have a significant
impact on the regional role that Vietnam will play in the next decade.
Vietnam's interests in the South China Sea may be divided into: a) traditional
national security interests, and; b) interests linked to the broader category of human
security.

Under the first category should be reckoned aims such as to defend the long s-shaped
coast against invasions, defend sovereignty to the Paracels (Hoang Sa) and
Spratlys (Truong Sa), gain exclusive control of resources in the seabed under
Vietnam's continental shelf as well as living resources in the sea out to 200 nautical
miles, collect customs, and suppress smuggling, piracy and other illegal activities
within Vietnam's 12 nautical miles territorial waters. All of these interests tend to
generate conflicts between Vietnam and the other nations around the South China
Sea.

Under the second category belongs aims such as to defend the population
against damage from typhoons, secure stocks of fish and other species for future
generations, prevent pollution, face the eventuality of major oil spills, build modern,
secure ports, maintain open communications, secure regional peace, attract reliable oil
companies to explore for oil and gas, and provide for international trade and
investments. These interests tend to generate a need for regional and international cooperation.

The means used to pursue the traditional security interests are not necessarily
effective in achieving human security. National security may be pursued by
maintaining a high military capability, entering into alliances with other powers, and
conducting nationalist propaganda domestically and internationally. These means,
however, are costly and can deteriorate relations with neighbouring states, thus
endangering human security. In pursuing human security for its population, the
Vietnamese government has found other means more useful, such as bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy, international co-operation in resource management and
environmental protection, and activities to develop a legal regime in the region, built
on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). All states with
claims in the Spratly area have now ratified the Convention.

This paper examines how Vietnam has perceived and weighed its interests in
the South China Sea, what means the government has employed to realise its basic
aims, and presents a hypothesis that there is currently a trend away from a narrow
focus on national security to a more broad-based concern for human security. This is
connected with a trend towards a more regional, less nationalist approach. These
trends in Vietnamese foreign policy may give Hanoi a key role in managing the
disputes in the South China Sea, not only within ASEAN, but also between the
ASEAN countries, China and Taiwan.

Introduction

The multi-national disputes in the South China Sea form a permanent threat to
Vietnam's national security, to its integration into ASEAN, and to further
improvements in its relationship to China.2 The disputes also threaten regional
security, and the interests of the populations around the South China Sea, who need to
be reassured against pollution, overfishing, piracy and war. The way Hanoi handles
the situation in the South China Sea may have a significant impact on Vietnam's
regional role during the next few decades.

Vietnam's aims in the South China Sea may be divided into: a) traditional
national security aims, and b) aims linked to the broader category of human and
regional security.

Under the first category should be reckoned aims such as to defend the long sshaped
coast against invasions, to defend sovereignty to the Paracels (Hoang Sa) and
the Spratlys (Truong Sa), to gain exclusive control of resources on and under
Vietnam's continental shelf as well as living resources in the sea out to 200 nautical
miles, to collect customs, and to suppress smuggling, piracy and other illegal
activities within Vietnam's 12 nautical mile territorial waters.3 As long as no formal
agreements have been reached on the delimitation of maritime boundaries, attempts to
pursue these aims tend to generate conflicts between Vietnam and the other nations
around the South China Sea.

Under the second category belongs aims such as to defend the population
against damage from typhoons, secure stocks of fish and other species for future
generations, prevent pollution, face the eventuality of major oil spills, build modern,
secure ports, maintain open communications, secure regional peace, attract serious oil
companies to explore for oil and gas, and provide for international trade and
investments. These aims tend to generate a need for regional and international cooperation.

The means used to pursue the traditional national security interests are not
necessarily effective in achieving human and regional security. National security may
be pursued by maintaining a high military capability, entering into alliances with
other powers, and conducting nationalist propaganda domestically and internationally.
These means are costly and can deteriorate relations with neighbouring states, thus
endangering human security. In pursuing human security for its population, the
Vietnamese government is finding other means more useful, such as bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy, international co-operation in resource management and
environmental protection, and activities to further develop an internationally
recognised legal regime, on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS was signed in 1982 and entered into force in
November 1994, one year after the sixtieth state had ratified it. All states with claims
in the Spratly area have now ratified the Convention (except Taiwan, who is not a
member of the United Nations).

This paper will examine how Vietnam has perceived and weighed its interests
in the South China Sea, what means the government has employed to realise its aims,
and test a hypothesis to the effect that there is an ongoing, gradual movement away
from a narrow focus on national security to a more broad-based concern for human
security. If this is so, there must also be a tendency towards a more regional, less
nationalist approach. This could, if Hanoi wants and is able to realise its opportunities,
give Vietnam a key role in managing, and eventually resolving, the disputes in the
South China Sea, not only among the ASEAN claimants, but also between the
ASEAN countries on the one side, China and Taiwan on the other.

(Download pdf file to read complete article)

Comments

Add New

RSS