VietWill - Defending Vietnamese lives and borders in the South China Sea

Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it's the only thing that ever has.

- Margaret Mead

Most Discussed

Latest Updates

Recently Discussed

China: Its geostrategy and energy needs

By Constantine C. Menges
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
30 October 2003

Testimony presented to: The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission

China’s geostrategy

Beginning in 1950, the communist government of

China

said that its goal in international politics is to promote peaceful relations with other states. Therefore, its international conduct would always be governed by the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” which

China

defined to include: mutual nonaggression and mutual noninterference.[1] .

Yet, during the 1950s China committed many acts of aggression including: sending nearly a million troops to battle the United Nations forces in support of North Korea; threatening invasion and attacking island territories controlled by Taiwan; and, supporting armed communist insurgent movements seeking to overthrow regional governments. Nevertheless, as the historian Hsu put it, “Peking succeeded to a large extent in preventing [most Asian] states from aligning with the West”[2] , even India despite China’s surprise attack in 1962 and continuing occupation of part of its territory.

In the post-Mao years, with

China

’s economic opening to the industrial democracies and other countries, there have been major changes in the methods of Chinese action in the world. While

China

continues to say that it seeks to promote peace and the principles of peaceful coexistence, it has now added the major purpose of promoting its own economic development. Also during the 1990s

China

increasingly repeated, as officially stated in its October 2000 Report on National Defense, that it seeks “a new international political, economic, and security order, responsive to the needs of our times”[3] .

While the content and structure of this “new international order” has not been made clear, obstacles to its realization that China often mentions are the alleged intention of the United States to dominate the world by what

China

calls “unipolarism” or “hegemonism”. Also, impeding the Chinese “new world order” are the alliances maintained by the United States in Asia, Europe and the world, all of which China condemns as contrary to peace and relics of “the cold war mentality”. China also opposes the plans of the United States for national missile defense and for Asian missile defense involving Japan,

South Korea

, and potentially other countries.

To read complete article please click on this link

Comments

Add New

RSS

Tony	\|06-02-2008 16:21:21

This article is quite long, but it has some very important information. If you don't have time to read all, at least look at the short section on the South China Sea.

Reply | Quote

Hoang Truong Sa

|06-02-2008 17:46:37

Here are, in my opinion, the most interesting parts of the paper:

Introduction- perspectives on China’s geostrategy
Beginning in 1950, the communist government of China said that its goal in international politics is to promote peaceful relations with other states. Therefore, its international conduct would always be governed by the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” which China defined to include: mutual nonaggression and mutual noninterference. [1] .
Yet, during the 1950s China committed many acts of aggression including: sending nearly a million troops to battle the United Nations forces in support of North Korea; threatening invasion and attacking island territories controlled by Taiwan; and, supporting armed communist insurgent movements seeking to overthrow regional governments. Nevertheless, as the historian Hsu put it, “Peking succeeded to a large extent in preventing [most Asian] states from aligning with the West” [2] , even India despite China’s surprise attack in 1962 and continuing occupation of part of its territory.
In the post-Mao years, with China’s economic opening to the industrial democracies and other countries, there have been major changes in the methods of Chinese action in the world. While China continues to say that it seeks to promote peace and the principles of peaceful coexistence, it has now added the major purpose of promoting its own economic development. Also during the 1990s China increasingly repeated, as officially stated in its October 2000 Report on National Defense, that it seeks “a new international political, economic, and security order, responsive to the needs of our times” [3] .
While the content and structure of this “new international order” has not been made clear, obstacles to its realization that China often mentions are the alleged intention of the United States to dominate the world by what China calls “unipolarism” or “hegemonism”. Also, impeding the Chinese “new world order” are the alliances maintained by the United States in Asia, Europe and the world, all of which China condemns as contrary to peace and relics of “the cold war mentality”. China also opposes the plans of the United States for national missile defense and for Asian missile defense involving Japan, South Korea, and potentially other countries.
Since 1990: increased aggressiveness despite export-led economic growth
Since 1980, China has had open access for its exports to the U.S. and other major democracies (while keeping restrictions on access to its market). Economic benefits for China from 1990 to 2002 have included a cumulative trade surplus with the US, Japan, and the EU greater than $1.1 trillion (of which $612 billion is with the U.S.), foreign direct investment exceeding $320 billion, and western economic assistance of more then $60 billion, all contributing to significant economic growth. These Chinese trade surpluses have led to its accumulation of more then $330 billion in hard currency reserves. [4]
Instead of these benefits from the democracies leading to a more peaceful and less politically repressive China, the opposite has occurred. During the 1990s there was a deepening of political and religious repression within China and an acceleration of military modernization in nuclear weapons, missiles, and other advanced weapons. [5]
China has spoken about building peaceful relations but in fact has often been coercive since 1990. It has territorial disputes with eleven of twenty five bordering and neighboring states [6] ; continues to transfer technology for weapons of mass destruction to potentially aggressive dictatorships which are also state sponsors of terrorism; has conducted large scale military espionage and covert influence operations against the United States and other countries; and, has failed to keep many of the arms limitation agreements it has signed. It is the pattern of actions by communist China and China’s own official pronouncements that indicate its purpose is to seek dominance, first in Asia and then more widely in the world.
Reasons for China’s pursuit of dominance in Asia and the world
The history of the twentieth century demonstrates that it is the inclination of political democracies to seek international security through conflict resolution, conflict prevention, and defensive alliances. In contrast, ideological or expansionist dictatorships such as the regime in China seek international security through the domination and the neutralization of potentially threatening governments. As the 21st century began, the government of China defined the world situation as follows:
… in today’s world, factors that may cause instability and uncertainty have markedly increased. The world is far from peaceful. There is a serious disequilibrium in the relative strength of certain countries. No fundamental change has been made in the old, familiar and irrational international political and economic order. Hegemonism and power politics [the actions of the United States] still exist and are pursuing and developing further in the international political, economic, and security spheres. Certain big powers [the United States] are pursuing neointerventionism, neogunboat policy, and neo-economic colonialism, which are seriously damaging the sovereignty, independence, and developmental interests of many countries and threatening world peace and security. [7]
This negative assessment echoed accusations also made publicly by the then-President Jiang Zemin of China. These are the public declarations of the private conclusions reached by the Chinese communist rulers in 1990, following their repression in Tiananmen Square. To protect itself from the actio ns of the United States defined as hostile “neointerventionism”, “neogunboat diplomacy” and “neo-economic colonialism”, China seeks to become dominant for a number of reasons.
1. Preserve the power of the Chinese Communist Party
The first reason China seeks international dominance is to preserve the power of the communist party and its unquestioned rule. The Party leadership has been concerned since the 1950s about what it perceives to be an American plot of promoting “peaceful evolution” from Communist dictatorship to democracy. It believes that the United States and the democracies caused the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the unraveling of the Soviet Union. Speaking publicly in June 2000, President Jiang Zemin reflected these concerns when he said: “our struggle to fight against western hostile forces infiltrating and seeking to overthrow [the Party] is a long and a complicated struggle that at times will be very intense” [8] . A few months later, the Chinese leadership witnessed the people of Serbia removing the long established communist dictatorship of that country (1945-2000) through an essentially peaceful popular uprising that some believed was secretly encouraged and aided by the United States and other democracies.
2. Counter the military power of the United States and its allies
China’s second concern is the military power of the United States which is perceived as limiting its ability to take control of Taiwan and attain its other territorial aims in Asia. It is this military power which permits the U.S. virtually alone in the world to announce the sale of a large number of defensive weapons to Taiwan on April 23,2001 followed the next day by the statement of President George W. Bush that if China attacked Taiwan, the U.S. would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself.” [9] This military power was demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf war, in the 2001 removal of the Taliban and in the 2003 removed of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. It is inherent in the U.S. arsenal of 6,000 strategic nuclear weapons, and in its system of alliances.
3. Ensure access to economic resources
A third reason for China to seek dominance is to ensure its continued economic modernization and growth. Chinese strategists have defined “comprehensive national power” to include the political will and leadership of a country, its economic, scientific, and technological resources and development as well as its military capabilities [10] . China’s involvement with the world economy since 1978, its rapid economic growth and enormous success in developing contemporary and advanced civilian and military technology all have made clear to the communist leadership that access to the economic, technological, energy and mineral resources of the world are essential to its future success.
Oil imports are an example of China’s inevitably growing dependence on resources from abroad. In the year 2000, China used about 4 million barrels of oil a day and produced about 3 million barrels a day [12] . A comprehensive analysis by Robert A Manning concluded that China’s energy production may increase slightly in the next years but that its oil and other energy import requirements will rise steadily as China’s economy continues to expand and becomes more developed and as more motor vehicles are used. The economy of China has been growing by more than 7% annually for many years. Assuming that in the next years China’s economy grew at a rate of about 5.5%, China is estimated to need to import about 4 million barrels of oil a day by 2010 and 6 million barrels of oil a day by 2020. [13]
Despite the leveling off in domestic Chinese oil production and its growing economy requiring more oil, the US department of Energy estimates that the total global demand for oil will increase to approximately 119 million of barrels per day by2025. [14] However, global production for that same year is expected to be at 124 million barrels per day which is double the number of barrels in the current reserve capacity. [15] China therefore has no objective need to be concerned about access to available oil resources through the international oil market. However, it is also very possible that in spite of the market realities that China’s leadership is likely to continue seeking guaranteed access and exclusive control over foreign oil resources.
China has witnessed economic sanctions imposed under US leadership on Serbia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba. China also experienced the negative effects of the temporary reduction in economic assistance and benefits imposed by the United States, Japan, and other countries after the Tiananmen massacre. For the Chinese regime, the best way to avoid the potential of future economic denial may be an extensive program combining geopolitical influence building and geoeconomic positioning. It has been seeking positions of dominance and political influence such that no major power would consider denying China the resources that it considers vital for the functioning of its economy and society. Examples of this include China’s systematic efforts to have positions of potential control on a number of key international shipping routes such as its South China Sea claims, its naval bases in Myanmar/Burma, its control of ports at both ends of the Panama Canal, and its control of major port facilities in the Bahamas, Rotterdam and the Suez Canal. (See map 1 following)
With these perspectives in mind, we now turn to a discussion of China’s geostrategy and energy needs in five regions of the world.
I. South China Sea/ “First Island Chain of Defense”
Since 1992, China has again explicitly declared the South China Sea to be its sovereign territory, although these are international waters with vital sea-lanes. To enforce its offshore territorial claims, China has occupied disputed islands by force which has involved threats against the Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
There are two main island groups in the South China Sea: the Paracel Islands are in the northern part, about 200 miles from the coast of Vietnam and they are claimed by Vietnam as well as by China. The Spratly islands are spread through the southern part of the South China Sea and include about 100 small islets, sand bars, reefs, and rocks, comprising a total area of no more than 1.8 square miles in a vast ocean. [16] While China claims all the Spratly islands, they are also claimed by Vietnam, which currently occupies 27 of the 100; the Philippines, which occupies 8, Malaysia which occupies 3; Taiwan which occupies 1, while China currently occupies 7 [17] . To date, there has been no definitive international arbitration of these competing claims.
In February 1995, the Philippines revealed that one of the Spratly Islands, named Mischief Reef, which was 150 miles from its island of Pelawan, and nearly 1000 miles from mainland of China, had been occupied by China. In May 1995 the Clinton Administration privately told the Philippines not to invoke the mutual defense treaty. Instead the US urged diplomacy and officially stated that it has:
...an abiding interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea. The United States calls upon claimants to intensify efforts to address issues related to competing claims, taking into account the interest of all parties and which contribute to peace and prosperity in the region. The United States is willing to assist in any way the claimants deem helpful. The United States reaffirms its welcome of the 1992 ASEAN declaration on the South China sea”. [18]
That formal pronouncement by the Department of State was ignored by China. In turn, the United States mostly ignored China’s further aggressive actions.
Yet, the May 1995 U.S. statement provides a preview of possible conflict with China in addition to that which might occur about Taiwan. The United States totally rejected the Chinese claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea and said further:
Maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States. Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is essential for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region, including the United States … The United States would … view with serious concern any maritime claim or restriction on activity in the South China sea that was not consistent with international law…. [19]
Testifying to the U.S. Congress in March 2000, the then Commander in Chief of US Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, said that in addition to their Taiwan claims, “Chinese authorities have also claimed sovereignty over the South China Sea. The resulting uncertainty over Chinese intentions in using force to resolve territorial claims creates concerns throughout the Asia Pacific region”. [20]
The effect of continuing acquiescence in these Chinese claims and actions could be to cede China de facto control over the islands in the South China Sea. China could then use the sovereign rights under international law over waters extending to twelve miles from land boundaries and the economic exclusion zone of 200 miles from the land border recognized under the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea in order to essentially establish large domains of sovereign control from the many Spratly islands and Paracel islands that might in effect give it operational or economic control over much of the South China Sea.
China has acted and spoken in a tone of belligerent entitlement in pressing its claims in the South China Sea and to the Paracel and Spratly islands. China has used force and has made clear that it is willing to use more force in the future if the other claimant countries fail to acquiesce in China’s purposes. Control of the South China Sea would facilitate China’s dominance of Asia, since US ships and aircraft as well as those of Japan, South Korea and other countries would have to have Chinese permission to transit the South China Sea, a major supply and transit route. It is estimated that 50% of world commerce and more than 41,000 ships annually transit the South China Sea (in comparison with about 4,000 ships transiting through the Panama Canal each year). [22] If China controlled the South China sea it could decide which country’s ships could transit and which could not, and thereby it would have a means to exert political pressure on Japan, South Korea, and other countries in the region that depend on supplies moving through the South China Sea for their energy and commercial deliveries. Energy and other supplies could be transported around the South China Sea but this would increase costs. [23]
Such a coercive use of control over the South China Sea would be consistent with the new Chinese geopolitical doctrine of the “first island chain of defense”. This was advanced as a strategic concept in the 1990’s by General Liu Huaqing, a close associate of Deng Xiaoping, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and member of the Politburo elite until his retirement in 1997. The first island chain of defense doctrine holds that to be secure China needs to control the entire region off its shores in a line from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines [24] .
In addition to this geopolitical purpose, dominance over the South China Sea and other adjacent waters could help China meet its future energy needs. Current estimates are that there could be 8 billion barrels of oil beneath the waters of the South China Sea within the internationally recognized exclusive economic zone of China. This could mean large additional energy resources in the entire South China Sea. The following table summarizes the estimated 29 billion barrels of oil within the recognized Chinese Economic Exclusion Zones within the four adjacent seas. In all these situations it is probable that large additional reserves also exist under waters claimed by Japan and other regional states within their economic exclusion zones.

Reply | Quote

Tony	\|06-03-2008 14:51:24

But I believe that in China's mentality, these would not be considered acts of aggression as we or the rest of the world would categorize them. I believe that China has engaged in war with every country that shares a border with China and has always declared that its actions were in self-defense.

Reply | Quote

Write comment

Name:

Email:

Website:

Title:

UBBCode: