Admin note: Below is the actual transcript of Dr. Balazs Szalontai's answers which has been obtained from Dr. Szalontai himself.
Dr. Balazs Szalontai: In 1955-1958, the DRV leadership, having to cope with internal difficulties and lacking sufficient international support, was far from achieving its aim of unifying Vietnam under its own rule. In these years, its primary ally was China, as the Soviet Union was not greatly interested in giving much direct support to North Vietnam. Under these circumstances, Hanoi could not hope to establish its authority over the Paracel and Spratly islands in the near future, and thus it did not suit its interest to risk a serious disagreement with the PRC over the islands. Therefore in these years the North Vietnamese government sought to secure Chinese support, and it went only so far as to evade making a public statement in favour of China's specific territorial claims or signing a binding agreement that would have explicitly renounced Vietnamese claims for the islands.
In 1974, the situation was completely different. With the U.S. troops gone and the Thieu regime getting weaker and weaker, the unification of Vietnam under northern rule was no longer a distant possibility. Had the Chinese not intervened, Hanoi could have easily taken the islands together with the rest of South Vietnam. Between 1968 and 1974, Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated to a very low level for various reasons, whereas the Soviet Union was giving intense support to the DRV. In such a situation, the North Vietnamese standpoint understandably became much more assertive, and less ready to please China, than it had been in the 1950s.
For similar reasons, China's standpoint had also become more inflexible than before. While Beijing may not have risked alienating an otherwise friendly and "reliable" Vietnam solely for the sake of annexing the Paracels, in 1974 it could no longer hope that Hanoi would take sides with it against Moscow. On the contrary, the DRV firmly resisted Chinese pressure to adopt an anti-Soviet standpoint, and it openly disagreed with the process of Sino-U.S. rapprochement. Moreover, in the end of 1973 and early 1974, the CCP leaders had good reason to feel that Sino-U.S. detente had failed to yield the expected results. Washington did not break diplomatic relations with Taiwan, nor did it refrain from seeking a rapprochement with the USSR. On the contrary, Soviet-U.S. detente was progressing well. Thus in 1974 the Chinese leaders felt encircled once again, and this is why they wanted to improve their strategic position in South-east Asia by occupying the Paracels, and increasing their support to the Khmer Rouge and the Burmese Communist guerrillas.
BBC: Why do you think there exists such a letter by Pham Van Dong? In what circumstances did Pham Van Dong write this now controversial document?
Dr. Balazs Szalontai: The general context of the Chinese declaration was the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in 1956, and the resulting treaties signed in 1958, such as the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Understandably, the PRC government, though not being a member of the U.N., also wanted to have a say in how these issues were dealt with. Hence the Chinese declaration of September 1958. In these years, as I said before, North Vietnam could hardly afford to alienate China. The Soviet Union did not give any substantial support to Vietnamese reunification, and neither South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem nor the U.S. government showed readiness to give consent to the holding of all-Vietnamese elections as stipulated by the Geneva Agreements. On the contrary, Diem did his best to suppress the Communist movement in the South. This is why Pham Van Dong felt it necessary to take sides with China, whose tough attitude toward the Asian policies of the U.S. offered some hope. And yet he seems to have been cautious enough to make a statement that supported only the principle that China was entitled for 12-mile territorial seas along its territory but evaded the issue of defining this territory. While the preceding Chinese statement was very specific, enumerating all the islands (including the Paracels and the Spratlys) for which the PRC laid claim, the DRV statement did not say a word about the concrete territories to which this rule was applicable. Still, it is true that in this bilateral territorial dispute between Chinese and Vietnamese interests, the DRV standpoint, more in a diplomatic than a legal sense, was incomparably closer to that of China than to that of South Vietnam.
BBC: There is also an alleged statement made by Ung Van Khiem in 1956, which has been publicly exploited by China? Does this alleged statement contribute to our understanding of Dong's letter?
Dr. Balazs Szalontai: According to the website of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in mid-1956 DRV Deputy Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem told the Chinese charge d'affaires that the Paracels and Spratlys were historically Chinese territories. At first I believed that the veracity of this statement must be doubtful. After all, in 2004 the Chinese Foreign Ministry simply deleted certain disputed periods of Korean history from the Korean section of its website, thus demonstrating its readiness to "modify" the historical past as it saw fit. I also accepted the logic that if Khiem did make this statement, it would have meant that the VWP leadership really intended to renounce Vietnam's claims for the Paracels and the Spratleys in favor of the PRC. But now I think otherwise, having studied, among others, Mongolia's border negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Namely, I realized that Khiem's statement actually had no binding force. In a Communist system, the statements made by a high-ranking official like Khiem is expected to represent the official views of the top leadership, but the leadership can disavow him and his statements at will by dismissing him under some seemingly unrelated pretext. This is what happened to Mongolian Foreign Minister Sodnomyn Averzed in 1958. During negotiations over a disputed part of the Soviet-Mongolian border, he adopted a rather firm standpoint, and, in all probability, he acted on the instructions of the top leadership. But when the Soviet side refused to yield the territory the Mongolians claimed, and complained of Averzed's "nationalist attitude", the top Mongolian leadership disavowed and promptly dismissed him. This could have happened to Khiem, too, if the top VWP leadership had wanted to disavow his statement. In any case, he was only a deputy foreign minister, and he made only a private verbal statement in the presence of a charge d'affaires. In a Communist system, this does not have the same binding force as a specific written agreement, an official government statement with precise references to the territorial issues, or a verbal statement made by a more or less "irreplaceable" leader, such as a prime minister, a head of state, or a general secretary. Obviously, the North Vietnamese leaders did not sign such an agreement, or make such a statement, because otherwise the Chinese would have already published it.
In sum, if the North Vietnamese leaders committed a sin, it was purposefully deceiving the Chinese, rather than seriously renouncing their claims for a part of Vietnamese territory. This is exactly the sin of which the Chinese accused them later, and in this particular case, the Chinese view seems to be more accurate than the South Vietnamese one.
BBC: Does Dong's letter have any legal meaning nowadays?
Dr. Balazs Szalontai: It weakens Vietnam's stance a bit, but I do not think it has any binding force. In my view, the Chinese statements emphasizing the principle of "silence is consent" carry little weight. The South Vietnamese government explicitly protested against China's claims, and made determined efforts to keep the islands, but this completely failed to deter China from occupying the Paracels. China simply ignored Saigon's protests. Had Hanoi protested, the result would have been the same.
BBC: What can Vietnam do with Dong's letter today? For a long time, there has been a silence, with no public debate about this incident. Can Vietnamese people have a debate about it without an impression of giving any kind of advantage to China?
Dr. Balazs Szalontai: I think a public discussion of the issue, given the relatively limited legal relevance of Pham Van Dong's letter, would not hurt either Vietnam or China, but of course the two governments may see the issue differently.
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BBC Vietnamese
Translated by Thinh Do
24 January 2008
Admin note: This interview was translated from Vietnamese by VietWill. The original language in which the interview was conducted is unknown. If the original interview was conducted in English, the present English translation may not be exactly the same as the words employed by the parties in the interview. If we are able to find the original transcript of the interview, we will post on this site.
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In 1958, North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm VÄn Äá»ng signed a letter that has caused numerous controversial arguments. The letter dated September 14, 1958 saying that the government of North Vietnam agreed with a concurrent Beijing’s announcement on China’s naval territory. In some public’s eyes, this letter has been viewed as North Vietnam’s acknowledgement of China’s sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys.
Recently, after numerous bilateral disputing arguments over the possession of the islands, once again - even though not in official circles – the letter signed by Phạm VÄn Äá»ng was brought up to all discussions among Vietnamese inside and outside the country. How do foreign researchers observe and evaluate this letter in accordance with this letter?
The BBC Vietnamese interviewed Dr. Balazs Szalontai, an Asia research scholar living in Hungary. First, Dr. Szalontai explains the two different viewpoints of North Vietnam in the decade of 1950 and in 1974 when the Paracels fell into China’s hands:
Dr. Balazs Szalontai: In 1955-1958, North Vietnamese leaders had not yet reached their goal of reunifying the country because they had to deal with internal troubles as well as lack of international support. Their key ally at this time was China. In such a situation, Hanoi could not hope affirming its control over the Paracels and Spartlys in the near future, and thus they could not afford significant dissimilarity with Beijing over the islands. The North Vietnamese government was managing to get China’s assistance; therefore it just attempted to neither offer open agreement on China’s specific (naval) sovereignty nor sign a forceful document that officially denounced its control over those islands.
In 1974, the situation was quite different. The matter of reunifying Vietnam was no longer out of reach. Even if China would not interfere, Hanoi could easily take over the islands as well as the rest of South Vietnam. From 1968 to 1974, Sino-Vietnam relations were dropped very low while the former Soviet Union increasingly supported the North. In this state, North Vietnam’s viewpoints toward China became tougher compared to that in the 1950s. For the same reasons, China also toughened its stance. Up until 1974, Beijing no longer hoped that Hanoi would be in the same boat against Moscow. Actually, at the end of 1973 early 1974, Russia sensed that the ease in Sino-US relations has not been as fruitful as expected. Washington was neither giving up diplomacy with Taiwan nor giving up negotiation with Moscow. The Soviet-US affiliation, in contrary, was going well. Because of this, in 1974, Beijing again sensed encirclement and decided to change its strategic position in Southeast Asia by the acts of invading the Paracels, boosting up its supports to the Khmer Rouge as well as to the Burmese communist gorillas.
BBC: According to your viewpoint, in what situation was the letter of the Phạm VÄn Äá»ng written?
Dr. Balazs Szalontai: First of all, let’s talk about China’s announcement. It was presented in the scenario of the 1956 UN convention on Law of the Sea and the 1958 subsequently signed agreements. It’s easy to understand that China, even though not yet a UN member, also purposefully wanted to voice in its solution to solve problems. Thus, there existed such an announcement in September 1958.
Like I said, in those years, North Vietnam could not upset China at a time when Russia did not fully support the reunification efforts. Meanwhile, Ngô Äình Diá»m in the South and the US were not ready implementing elections as stated in the Geneva agreement. Phạm VÄn Äá»ng, therefore, saw the necessity to turn to China; nonetheless, he seemed to be discreet enough to give out just an announcement acknowledging - on a general principle - China’s 12-nautical-mile sovereignty from its shoreline, but steered clear of definition of such sovereignty. Despite Beijing’s specific inclusion of the entire Paracels and Spratlys islands in its proclamation, Phạm VÄn Äá»ng’s letter mentioned no single word regarding such specific territorial names.
In this bilateral territorial dispute, North Vietnam’s standpoint (with regard to Phạm VÄn Äá»ng’s letter) bearing more of a diplomatic sense than legitimate implication, was closer to China’s standpoint than that of South Vietnam.
BBC: In addition to the Phạm VÄn Äá»ng’s letter, there was also another statement agreeing to China’s claim, given in 1956 by Mr. Ung VÄn Khiêm - North Vietnam’s former Deputy of Foreign Minister, in which China openly cited. Does that statement help explain more about the letter?
Dr. Balazs Szalontai: According to a Chinese Foreign Department (CFD) website, in mid 1956, Ung VÄn Khiêm told China’s interim ambassador that the Paracels and Spratlys historically belonged to China. At first, I doubted the truthfulness of that statement. Back in 2004, CFD even removed chapters containing arguments over Korea’s history from its website. This means China’s willing to alter past history to serve up its own interests.
I used to accept the argument that if Khiêm actually stated so, then it meant North Vietnam leaders really intentionally abandoned Vietnam’s control over the two islands. But now I think otherwise, and the reason for this rethinking is when I reviewed border agreements between Mongolia and Russia.
I realized that Khiêm’s statement actually had no binding effect. In the communism system, an officer’s statement like that of Khiem might be considered representing official government’s standpoint. But the government could also bypass him and nullify his statements by firing him with accusation that seemed not relating to the issue.
That was also the fate of Mongolian Foreign Minister Sodnomyn Averzed in 1958. He showed his hard-line viewpoint while negotiating in the Russia-Mongolia border dispute, and it’s likely that he followed the government’s instructions. Not only when Russia refused to give back land that Mongolia requested but also criticized Averzed’s “nationalism attitude,” Mongolia fired him.
In he case of Ung VÄn Khiêm, he was just a Deputy of Foreign Minister at the time, and it was just a word-of-mouth statement to China’s interim ambassador. In the communism system, a word-of-mouth statement does not possess the same power as a written statement relating territorial issues. Neither it possesses heavy weight as that done by higher ranking officials like Prime Minister or President or General Secretary. Obviously, neither North Vietnamese leaders signed nor said a so-called agreement because if they did, China would already published.
BBC: In your opinion, does the Phạm VÄn Äá»ng’s letter carry any legitimate meaning?
Dr. Balazs Szalontai: The letter insignificantly weakened Vietnam’s claim, but I assume it does not have binding weight. In my opinion, while China stressed the principle of “Silence means Consent,” it’s not as heavy-weighted. The government of South Vietnam already openly protested against China’s claims and attempted defending the islands, but they could not stop China from attacking and occupying the Paracels. China simply ignored Saigon’s protest. Even if Hanoi also voiced objection at that time, the result would be the same.
BBC: Nowadays, what can people do with Mr. Äá»ng’s letter? For a long period, it’s just silence in Vietnam. Do you think if Vietnamese now can openly debate this letter it will just be beneficial for China?
Dr. Balazs Szlontai: In my opinion, Phạm VÄn Äá»ng’s letter only has a limited legitimacy value. Because of this, an open debate on this issue will not harm either Vietnam or China. However, of course, the two governments might view this issue in a different way.
Dr. Balazs Szalontai has taught at National University of Mongolia, and is presently an independent researcher in Hungary. He is the author of Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964 Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/story/2008/01/080124_vietnamchinaphamvandong.shtml
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The content of Pham Van Dong's diplomatic note to Premier Zhou Enlai is as follows:
"Comrade Prime Minister,
We have the honour to bring to your knowledge that the Government of the DRVN acknowledges and approves the declaration dated 4th September, 1958 of the Government of the PRO fixing the width of the Chinese territorial waters. The Government of the DRVN respects this decision and will give instructions to its State bodies to respect the 12-mile width of the territorial waters of China in all their relations in the maritime field with the PRC. I address to you, comrade Prime Minister, the assurance of my distinguished consideration".
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for your acknowlegment that China's rise is not as peacefully as it is in Beijing's Confucian-guided and honey-coated statement.
In 1958, the North Vietnamese government didn't have any authority over Parace & Spratly islands. First, they can't give away what they didn't own. Second, Pham Van Dong, himself has no right to give away the land that is owned by the whole nation. No single person can give away land to foreigners.