It would be of prime interest to see how the conflict prevention in the Spratly Islands has been conducted and what conclusions we can draw from the experience of this specific dispute. Since there is no one-fit-all formula to analyze a particular conflict case, the mixture of conflict analytical frameworks or theories suggested by Sandole (2008), Galtung (1996), Mitchell (1981), and Wehr (1979) will be taken into account in analyzing the Spratly Islands conflict. This paper argues that the conflict management and intervention efforts implemented so far in the Spratly Islands to some extent failed due to the realist perspectives of all the claimants, particularly China, regarding their claims. Thus, throughout the paper the conflict origins and dynamics will be first scrutinized, then the efforts of conflict management and intervention will be analyzed, while the lessons learned and recommendations will be proposed to end the article.

Paper for the 3rd International Conference on Vietnamese Studies, Hanoi, Vietnam December 4-7, 2008
By Carlyle A. Thayer

Introduction

Much of the scholarly work that focuses on relations between Vietnam and China stresses the importance of bilateral relations (Amer 2004a and 2008, Vuving 2005 and 2006a and Womack 2006). This paper extends the framework of analysis to include the key multilateral and bilateral structures that influence this relationship. The paper is divided into three parts. The first deals with bilateral structures, the second considers multilateral structures and the third focuses on the interplay of multilateral and bilateral structures in fostering economic cooperation and managing territorial disputes.

Part one discusses the structure of bilateral relations since 1999-2000 when long-term cooperative framework agreements were reached between party and state officials. These agreements led to the creation of expert- and government-level working groups to consider key issues in dispute such as the land border, Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea (Amer 2008: 12). The long-term cooperative framework also resulted in the exchange of delegations led by high-level party and state officials.

Part two stresses the importance of multilateral structures and multilateral agreements negotiated by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) with China prior to and after Vietnam’s membership. Among the structures and agreements considered: ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee and the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and Plan of Action (2005-2010). Part two also considers the influence of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on Vietnam-China relations.

Part three reviews a number of issues relating to Sino-Vietnamese cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea and evaluates the impact of multilateral and bilateral structures in dealing effectively with these issues. The paper concludes by noting the importance role of high-level leadership meetings, including the Joint Steering Committee on Cooperation, as key structures in the management of Vietnam-China relations.

Finally, the conclusion offers a net assessment of what the structure of Vietnam’s bilateral and multilateral relations with China reveals about Vietnam’s strategy for dealing with its northern neighbour. This section critically reviews five major strategies identified in the scholarly literature: balancing, hedging, bandwagoning, engagement and omni-enmeshment.

In the South China Sea, the Law and Geography are China’s Two Enemies

      The two principles guiding the Law of the Sea are:

1.Protecting the fishing rights of coastal nations and their right to exploit oil and natural gas within 200 nautical miles of their coastline

2. Preserving  the freedom of the high sea and the freedom to exploit deep seabed mining.

      Below are the general concepts for the technical terminology used in the Law of the Sea.

      According to the International Court of Justice at The Hague and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Historic Waters represent the internal waters on the landward side of the baseline of the Territorial Sea.

The Baseline usually refers to the low-water line along the coasts.

The Territorial Sea extend 12 nautical miles from the Baseline.

      The Exclusive Economic Zone extends 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

      The Continental Shelf usually extends 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

      An island is a naturally formed area of land surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.  The Islands of Taiwan or Ceylon have been granted an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf of 200 nautical miles.  However, small islands which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have only a territorial sea (such as the Paracel and Spratly Islands).  

The island disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) are either bilateral, trilateral or, when they involve more than three parties, multilateral. The most serious of these disputes, however, are those on the Paracels and the Spratlys, because they also involve non-Southeast Asians and, in the case of the Spratlys, they involve many parties.

According to the International Hydrographic Bureau, the South China Sea is defined as the body of water stretching from a southwesterly to a north-easterly direction, bordered on the South by 3° South latitude between South Sumatera and Kalimantan (Karimata Straits) and on the north by the Strait of Taiwan, from the northern tip of Taiwan to the Fukien coast of China. For the purpose of this paper, however, the southern perimeter of the South China Sea is deemed to be 1° North latitude, thus making it an area of about three million square kilometers of water.